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ROGER E. MEINERS & DOMINIC P. PARKER*

Legal and Economic Issues in Private
Land Conservation
When a big-box store is built on a nice piece of land, those of us
who live nearby feel like we have lost a little something. Formerly scenic
space, such as farmland or a grove of trees, may be converted to the
house we live in, stores where we shop, or restaurants where we eat.
Increased concern about land development is resulting in more actions
being discussed and implemented to encourage continued farming and
preserve scenic views, wildlife habitat, and other amenities associated
with agricultural land. The pressure to preserve land is not so much
from farmers, who can choose to farm or not, but from urbanites who
wish to observe farming and enjoy benefits provided by undeveloped
lands. Much of the action taken in response to this pressure can be
categorized as either political or market-driven.
Either through majority vote or legislative edict, the regulatory
actions of political institutions can dictate land use decisions. For
example, growth boundaries can push development into pre-determined
locations.' Or, a change in zoning or endangered species habitat
designation can impose restrictions on some property owners without
2
their consent.
Such regulatory instruments have at least three shortcomings.
First, decisions made by politicians will favor some constituents at the
expense of others. 3 For example, because growth boundaries benefit
landowners allowed to develop their property, we expect the delineation
to be highly political. 4 Responding to unforeseen and unknowable
. PERC Senior Associate; PERC Research Associate.
1. Portland's Urban Growth Boundary is America's most prominent and is lauded by
some urban planners as an archetype design for controlling development. See, e.g., Arthur

C. Nelson, Oregon's Urban Growth Boundary Policy as a Landmark PlanningTool, in PLANNING
THE OREGON WAY: A TWENTY YEAR EVALUATION 25 (Carl Abbott et al. eds., 1994). For a less
favorable evaluation, see generally John Charles, Lessons from the PortlandExperience, in A
GUIDE To SMART GROWTH: SHATTERING MYTHS, PROVIDING SOLUTIONS 0ane S. Shaw &

Ronald D. Utt eds., 2000).
2. See generally Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, The Destructive Role of LandUse Planning, 14 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 95 (2000); Barton H. Thompson, The Endangered Species

Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305 (1997).
3. See generally JAMEs M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT, LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
4. When elected officials forbid development on open land, adjacent landowners see a
windfall increase in their property value. In contrast, owners of undeveloped land
subjected to the restrictions lose some property value. And renters and future residents will
probably pay more for housing. See Richard L. Stroup, Planning Versus Market Solutions, in
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contingencies in the future is cumbersome, as parties with stakes in the
status quo will not passively allow policy amendments. This is
problematic because there is no assurance that present day land use rules
are optimal for future generations. Second, land use regulations can have
adverse and unintended consequences. For example, landowners facing
Endangered Species Act restrictions have incentives to harm the very
species supposedly being protected. 5 Growth restrictions in some locales
can raise urban housing prices and actually encourage sprawl. 6 Third,
the political process will not be disciplined by forces that signal where
open space preservation is most appropriate given the values of
alternative land uses. 7 Because political opportunists are exempt from
bearing the costs of restricting uses of property owned by others, they
have weak incentives to think carefully about the relative costs of
preserving different tracts of land.
Market-driven institutions and instruments are more dynamic
mechanisms that rely on voluntary exchanges by those willing and able
to pay, to determine the use of space in a community. 8 Clearly defined
property rights enable demanders of open spaces to compete with
demanders of developed land. When faced with the full opportunity cost
of a development project, demanders of open space are likely to carefully
choose which parcels to target because decisions to preserve a parcel
come at the expense of conserving open space elsewhere. If forced to bid
against demanders of open space, developers will be less apt to build on
tracts of land that are most desired as open space. The parties bidding for
land will also speculate on the future availability of substitute land and
consider the complementary effects of developing or not developing.
They will be cautious about binding their hands if they expect that
current decisions will be costly to reverse. Contrary to stereotypes of the
recklessness of unfettered markets, players in the market who bear the
full costs of their decisions will be less cavalier than their political
counterparts. 9
A GUIDE TO SMART GROwrH: SHATrERING MYTHS, PROVIDING SOLUTIONS 17 (Jane S. Shaw

& Ronald D. Utt eds., 2000); Gerard C.S. Mildner, Regionalism and the Growth Management
Movement, in SMARTER GROWTH: MARKET BASED STRATEGIES FOR LAND USE PLANNING IN

THE 21sT CENTURY (Randall G. Holcombe & Samuel R. Staley eds., 2001).
5. See Michael J. Bean & David S. Wilcove, The Private-landProblem, 11 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 1 (1997); Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction Under the
EndangeredSpecies Act, 46 J.L. & ECON. 27 (2003).
6. See Mildner, supra note 4.
7. See Louis DeAlessi, Private Property Rights as the Basis for Free Market Environmentalism (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998); Morriss & Meiners, supra note 2.
8. See Donald Boudreaux et al., Talk Is Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVT. L.
765 (1999); Morriss & Meiners, supra note 2.
9. Morriss & Meiners, supra note 2.
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Of course, market outcomes under a clear rule of property law
are more complex to achieve than the simple elements just portrayed.
The purpose of this set of papers is to address many of the difficult legal,
economic, and political issues at play in attempting to satisfy desires to
protect land from development. Those who insist that coercive measures
must be taken because we are a nation at risk of unending vistas of
cookie-cutter houses and shopping malls also proffer a nightmare vision
too simplistic to be accepted as the basis for policy actions. Here we
attempt to offer some analyses that help us grapple with a set of difficult
issues.
As Terry L. Anderson describes in Viewing Land Conservation
Through Coase-Colored Glasses, markets for open space fall short of
nirvana expectations because of demand and supply side transaction
costs. On the demand side, free riders are difficult to exclude from
consuming amenities like scenic views. Private parties are said to
underproduce open space because they cannot capture its value to
others. On the supply side, the major transaction cost lies in monitoring
agents to ensure that they will act on behalf of beneficiaries of open
space amenities. Anderson notes that this can be difficult when the open
space product is vague or when the link between principal and agent is
ill defined.
It is tempting, and often politically expedient, to "solve" the
problems identified by Anderson with "corrective" taxes and land use
regulations. In Mhen Are Environmental Amenities Policy-Relevant?, David
D. Haddock questions the extent of the real-world problems that
Anderson reviews. According to Haddock, too many situations,
especially in the environmental area, are asserted to suffer from underprovision of amenities because of the pervasiveness of high transaction
costs that supposedly prevent the most efficient solution from emerging.
Haddock bases his argument on classic articles by Nobel laureates
Ronald Coase and James Buchanan that deal with the problem of
externalities and transaction costs. From that foundation, Haddock
demonstrates that free riding does not necessarily mean that the private
sector will provide fewer environmental amenities than optimal given
demand and cost conditions. On the contrary, Haddock's model shows
that private decision makers often do provide the amount most desired
by voluntary actors. Even when beneficial amenities are underproduced,
the costs of corrective responses in a less-than-perfect world of public
decision makers must be weighed against the costs of doing nothing.
The trend "toward the collectivization of development in the
name of enhancement of environmental amenities," as described in
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Steven J. Eagle's response to Haddock,1° suggests that policy makers are
uncomfortable doing nothing. Collectivization, argues Eagle, is
advocated by beneficiaries of environmental regulations and is becoming
"institutionalized" by recent changes in property law. According to
Eagle, states have expanded the scope of the public trust doctrine,
localities have used ad hoc and unconstrained methods to meter
development, and courts have invoked the concept of "givings
recapture" as a justification for restricting private property rights to
provide environmental amenities.
It is unlikely that any of these institutionalized, corrective
schemes will dynamically optimize the preservation or protection of
various lands. We cannot, of course, "reform" government decision
making in such a way that eliminates politicians' incentives to cater to
well organized special interest groups." The question then is, can the
market process be relied upon to do the job better than a special interest
driven political process? Drawing on the property-rights approach
pioneered by Ronald Coase, Anderson argues that there is good reason
to believe the market process, under a rule of law that allows creative
reductions in transaction costs, may indeed take us further than
commonly assumed. Rising environmental values, he notes, motivate
environmental entrepreneurs to devise solutions for problems
previously thought intractable.
Private management is often not politically feasible, especially
when land has been historically held in public ownership. In such cases,
public entrepreneurship can take place through experimentation with
quasi-market features. Sally K. Fairfax, Lauren Gwin, and Lynn
Huntsinger examine two special federal land designations. 12 The
Presidio in California is associated with the National Park Service (NIS)
and the Valles Caldera in New Mexico is associated with the U.S. Forest
Service (USFS). Although the management of each area differs in
substantive ways, these special designations are managed similarly
when compared to general NPS and USFS land. Some authority is
devolved to local parties and management mandates are modestly
narrower.
10. Steven J. Eagle, Environmental Amenities, PrivateProperty, and Public Policy, 44 NAT.
RESOURCEsJ. 425,443 (2004).
11. See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211
(1976); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groupsfor Political Influence,
98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983) (arguing that small pressure groups with homogeneous interests
are successful in getting subsidies and payments funded by larger voting blocs with more
dispersed interests).
12. Sally K. Fairfax et al.,
Presidio and Valles Caldera:A PreliminaryAssessment of Their
Meaningfor PublicResource Management, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 446 (2004).
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James L. Huffman anticipates that these features will help to
create better incentive structures for managers, noting that "there are
potential efficiency gains even where so-called private approaches are
really only decentralized public entities." 13 Gains may be realized
because the transaction costs of making informed decisions are likely to
fall, and because interest groups without a local presence will have less
influence on land management. While the actual effects of these
arrangements remain to be seen, the experiments described by Fairfax et
al. provide opportunities for learning how to improve public land
management.
Land trusts have emerged as the dominant institution for
preserving and enhancing environmental amenities on private land.
They have two primary instruments by which to do so: conservation
easements and full ownership of land. Dominic P. Parker asks whether
land trusts treat easements as merely a cheaper substitute for full
ownership of land. 14 Using economic analysis, Parker suggests that a
more complicated explanation is warranted. He concludes that trusts
generally prefer the easement instrument in cases where the
arrangement is easy to monitor and enforce, or when potential gains
from landowner specialization are high. In contrast, trusts looking to
enhance environmental amenities for beneficiaries (e.g., trail building,
constructing wetlands, etc.) will prefer full ownership of land. The
broader implication of Parker's position-that land trusts weigh the
long-term economics of managing easements against land ownershipmay be that self-regulation and the sharing of training resources are
helping to promote cost-effective strategies among land trusts.
5
Bruce Yandle critiques various aspects of Parker's argument.'
He points out that "conservation" may have widely different meanings
from different areas of the country and that this may complicate Parker's
effort to use data aggregated from trusts around the nation. Yandle also
suggests that we instead view landowners as the decision makers and
land trusts as passive acceptors of donated land rights. Taking this view
allows land use regulations imposed by government to influence
whether land or easements are donated to land trusts. This factor, argues
Yandle, may partially explain the phenomenal growth of land trusts in
recent years.
13. James L. Huffman, Limited Prospects for Privatization of Public Lands: Presidio and
Valles CalderaMay Be as Good as It Gets, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 475, 481 (2004).
14. Dominic P. Parker, Land Trusts and the Choice to Conserve Land with Full Ownership or
Conservation Easements, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 483 (2004).
15. Bruce Yandle, Comments on Land Trusts and the Choice to Conserve Land with Full
Ownership or Conservation Easements, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J.519 (2004).
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While Parker and Yandle focus on the tradeoffs land trusts face
when choosing conservation easements, Christopher S. Elmendorf
contemplates alternative contracting instruments. 16 Elmendorf asks
whether a land trust can engage in active management on land the trust
does not own given the exposure to opportunistic behavior (considering
that the trust may not wish to own the land for economic or political
reasons). The land trusts' exposure is high, argues Elmendorf, because
their investments in ecological restoration are generally not salvageable.
Potential holdouts exacerbate the problem when the land trust tries to
restore the ecological function of a fragmented landscape of many
parcels. Elmendorf lays out two strategic responses to opportunistic
behavior, the most promising of which he considers to be "collective
contracting" through supermajoritarian special districts.
Susan F. French, however, finds greater potential in Elmendorf's
proposal of structuring long-term servitudes in ways that reduce the
land trusts' and landowners' exposure to opportunistic behavior. Such
strategies include "stretching out payment over the life of the project and
providing for a process for the trust to acquire additional use restrictions
in the future.... "17 With the inclusion of these provisions, according to
French, a conservation servitude could substitute for fee simple
ownership and provide a land trust with some assurance to invest in
ecological restoration.
The next articles of the collection ask whether conservation
easements should be perpetual, a requirement of the federal tax code
that is lauded by most environmentalists. Julia D. Mahoney attacks the
logic of perpetual easements on several fronts. She maintains that
"policy makers are wrong to assume that reversing choices to conserve
land will necessarily prove cheaper and easier than revisiting decisions
to develop."' 8 According to Mahoney, many development decisions are
in fact not irreversible. Yet future generations cannot change the use of
lands encumbered by easements unless they are able to overcome
institutional obstacles put in place to prevent development. This is a
problem, she argues, because our conception of "development" may be
different in the future. Because circumstances and preferences change,
Mahoney argues for flexibility and greater thought as to how
conservation decisions might be reconsidered.
16. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Securing Ecological Investments on Other People's Land: A
Transaction-CostsPerspective,44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 529 (2004).
17. Susan F. French, What's a Poor Land Trust to Do? Alternatives for Dealing with an
OpportunisticWorld, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563 (2004).
18. Julia D. Mahoney, The Illusion of Perpetuity and the Preservation of Privately Owned
Lands, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 573 (2004).
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Barton H. Thompson is sympathetic to Mahoney's concerns but
does not find them19quite as troubling. Thompson explains a number of
"strong rationales" for adopting perpetual conservation easements and
other intergenerational conservancies. For example, intergenerational
conservancies economize on the transaction costs of constantly having to
negotiate new conservation agreements. In addition, such conservancies
can forestall imprudent landowner decisions that are motivated by
temporary and fleeting circumstances. Thompson concludes by
proposing several reforms to discourage illegitimate use of perpetual
easements and intergenerational conservancies.
This collection of articles stands in contrast to much of the
literature on private land conservation. As Professor Andrew P. Morriss
notes, 20 the literature is dominated by authors favoring assorted statist
approaches. Only a small part of the literature is devoted to a study of
the legal tools available, and in use, for voluntary conservation. Given
that the large majority of the land in the United States is privately
owned, however, the reality is that voluntary conservation must
dominate or little will change. Contrasted to the numerous polemics on
the subject of land protection, Morriss shows that there are several
noteworthy sources rich in the elements of the law and its application in
practice. Some books he reviews concern "ordinary" people going about
the business of protecting the land that they love. Rather than hope that
a gaggle of politicians will see the light and protect land they desire,
people around the country are quietly achieving environmental goals
important to them, given the legal constraints they face and the realities
of the many tradeoffs that affect complex conservation decisions. The
articles in this volume add rich analysis to the issues covered in the
books reviewed by Morriss.
In addition, the articles in this collection hint at related issues to
examine in future research. For example, Elmendorf, Parker, and
Thompson raise questions related to the effects of funding conservation
easements through the federal tax code. Elmendorf asks why we should
privilege the perpetual conservation easement against alternative
contracting instruments, which may in some cases be better suited for
the task at hand. Parker argues that tax code funding weakens incentives
for land trusts and landowners to minimize the full, long-term costs of
conserving environmental amenities. Thompson notes that tax laws may
encourage perpetual easements over amenities lacking public good
19. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Trouble with Time: Influencing the Conservation Choices
of Future Generations,44 NAT. REsOuRCESJ. 601 (2004).
20. Andrew P. Morriss, Private Conservation Literature:A Survey, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J.
621 (2004).
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characteristics and may unnecessarily hinder the extinguishment of
easements
of marginal
environmental
benefit. Given these
considerations, a comparative analysis of tax code financing against
alternative funding mechanisms seems appropriate.
Yandle alludes to another area that is ripe for future research. 21
Federal government easement acquisition programs may compete with
private land trusts. Funding for the wetland reserve and farmland
protection programs, for example, has increased significantly with the
passage of the 2002 Farm Bill. 22 Augmentation of these programs
provides an impetus for investigating the following questions: How will
the spending be spatially allocated? Will the acquisitions complement or
substitute for private activity? Will the federal easements adapt to local
conditions? Will they be monitored and enforced with vigilance?
In conclusion, we would like to thank those who have supported
the completion of this volume. Comments from participants at PERC's
Forum, Private Land Conservation:Institution and Instruments, in Big Sky,
Montana, helped to refine the ideas presented herein. In addition to the
authors of this volume, forum participants included legal scholars
Thomas Merrill and Rob Natelson; economists Richard Stroup, Walter
Thurman, and Myles Watts; and land trust practitioners Andrew Dana
and William Long. For helping to coordinate the forum, we thank
Monica Lane Guenther and Colleen Lane. Finally, this project was made
possible by the generous financial support of the Maytag Family
Foundation and the Dunn Foundation for the Advancement of Right
Thinking. We thank them for investing in this research and hope that
these ideas generate tangible results in the form of sustainable
institutions and instruments for voluntary conservation of private land.

21. Yandle, supra note 15, at 527.
22. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002. For a summary of the
conservation programs authorized or reauthorized by the legislation, see Conservation
Programson the website of the USDA's Natural Resource Conservation Service, availableat
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/ (last visited Apr. 30,2004).

